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Ethnonationalism in the Soviet Union: the Case 
of the Baltic States 
Luba Racanska 
St. John's University 
The bloody crackdown in Lithuania by the Soviet Air -
borne Troops ordered into that country and six other indepen-
denceminded Soviet Republics by President Mikhail Gorbachev 
on January 7, 1991, shocked the Western world. The deployment 
was necessary, according to a Defense Ministry announcement, to 
enforce conscription regulations in the troubled areas, where turn-
out for the fall 1990 military draft has been especially low. 1 Yet 
Gorbachev's decision to send the paratroopers into Lithuania 
appears to be dictated more by political developments in the Baltic 
republics rather than the officially stated defense considerations. 
For Gorbachev, who is fighting a desperate battle to save the 
internal empire and the political structure upon which his own 
power rests, the conscription issue appears to provide a conven -
ient excuse to bring the most defiant republics into line. 
Among all troubled union republics, popular support for 
national sovereignty has been strongest in Lithuania and the other 
two Baltic republics of Latvia and Estonia, where the opposition 
to conscription has been only one part of their broad assertion to 
autonomy. In the era of ~lasnost and perestroika, draft dodging 
has become a political act supported by local parliaments, govern-
ments and pro-independence movements. The growth of nation-
alist sentiments among Russians and non-Russians and the esca-
lation of demands in the Baltic republics has weakened Gorbachev 's 
position within the Soviet leadership by fermenting instability and 
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complicating his consolidation process. The latest assertion of 
Moscow's authority in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991 
military crackdown only underlines the dwindling support en-
joyed by the national government and the leadership's determina-
tion to save the union at any cost, including a serious set-back in 
East-West relations. Gorbachev is willing to pay the price because 
the survival of the union is closely related to his continued tenure 
in power and the success of his Perestroika policy. 
The ~ Qf Ethnonationalism 
The source of this latest rise of ethnonationalism in the 
Soviet Union can, ironically, be found in the Gorbachev's "revo-
lution from above"-the blueprint for economic restructuring of 
the Soviet Union known as perestroika, coupled with ~lasnost or 
openness in the Soviet society-that encouraged the airing in 
public of pressing questions in all union republics. The result of 
these policies was an unintended rise of nationalist and ethnic 
demands in the Baltic republics. In a country whose ideology long 
enforced silence about national discontent, Gorbachev's policies 
of decentralization and greater freedom to speak had immediate 
implications for general nationality policy. In the Baltic republics 
of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia especially, ~lasnost resulted in 
less reticence to discuss underlying political, social and economic 
problems. The attempts at economic decentralization since 1985, 
accompanied by relaxed censorship at all levels, encouraged by 
the end of the 1980s the emergence of openly vocal national 
movements in all fifteen Union Republics whose demands vary 
from greater autonomy to frank demands of secession. 2 
This vocal and widespread resurgence of ethnic national-
ism in the Soviet Union during the leadership of Mikhail Gor-
bachev has become, in the words of Arkady I. Vol sky, who was 
sent to preside over the shaky peace in the embattled Azerbaijani 
territory of Nagorno-Karabak3, the national curse because the 
feeling of ethnic belonging has never been supplanted by a 
broader sense of Soviet citizenship. Leonid Brezhnev's official 
pronouncements of the 1970s announcing the emergence of a new 
Soviet socialist nation populated by Soviet people forged from the 
"ethnic mosaic" of the old Russian Empire sounds hollow in the 
aftermath of the escalating nationalist demands by the ethnic 
minorities since the late 1980s.4 Even if such "ethnic mosaic" of 
national minorities were truly possible, President Gorbachev now 
faces an array of problems-ranging from mass migrations and 
conflict along the nation's southern border, to Popular Front 
movements in critical areas like the Ukraine, to the demands for 
greater autonomy and push for independence in Latvia, Lithuania 
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and Estonia. 
For Gorbachev, the increasing! y assertive ethnic national-
ism among the non-Russian minorities of the USSR has emerged 
as the major conflict area in Soviet domestic politics. The Party's 
Draft Platform on Nationalities Policy of August 1989 acknowl -
edged that the nationalities question in the Soviet Union has 
become exceptionally acute and suggested that a solution to the 
problems that have arisen in this connection is of enormous 
importance for the fate of restructuring and the future of the 
country. 5 Besides placing Perestroika in jeopardy, the peripheral, 
border location of the vocal ethnic groups make national identity 
a military and security issue that has the potential to undermine the 
improved East-West relations orchestrated by Gorbachev. The 
ethnic unrest poses a threat not only to the cohesiveness of the 
Soviet Union- a threat in itself to the international stability-but 
also to the carefully nurtured image of Mr. Gorbachev in the West 
as a reformer of the Soviet system. The swift military action in 
Lithuania on January 13, 1991, where fifteen persons were killed 
by Soviet Army tanks, has already damaged Gorbachev's image 
of a reformer as indicated by the suspension and slowdown of 
badly needed aid to Moscow by several Western governments. 6 
The adaptation of the policy by the Western governments oc-
curred despite Mr. Gorbachev's denial that the confrontations in 
the Baltic states marked any change in his policies or his abandon-
ment of the reforn1ist course he announced five years ago. 
Ethnonationalism in the Baltic Republics 
The most serious challenge to the cohesiveness of the 
Soviet Union comes from the national movements in the Baltic 
republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In all three republics, 
popular front movements with commanding public support have 
pressed for greater economic and political independence, includ-
ing the option of secession if their craving for sovereignty cannot 
be satisfied within the present Soviet federation. Under 
Gorbachev's policy of ~lasnost. controversy surrounding ethnic 
politics has assumed numerous forms and has been given an 
astounding degree of legitimacy. Protests, strikes, work stop-
pages, demonstrations and the like have become an almost "nor-
mal" part of the political process in the Baltic states. 7 Once -this 
process was legitimized through public discussion, Gorbachev 
and his colleagues could not claim a monopoly on agenda-setting, 
especially in areas dealing with inter-ethnic issues. 
The early catalyst for Baltic activism and rising national-
ism was the concern for the environment. With Gorbachev's 
encouragement to seek solutions to the environmental problems 
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present in the Soviet society, especially after the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor accident in the Ukraine, the Bal tic activists quickly 
seized the opportunity to speak out about the intolerable environ-
mental conditions present in the theirrepublics. The blame for the 
environmental degradation was laid at the steps of the centralized 
Stalinist drive of rapid industrialization that failed to adequately 
assess the damaging environmental consequences of mammoth 
factory projects, mines or energy-generating plants in the Baltic. 
Besides the environmental concerns, the rapid industriali-
zation also resulted in a large influx of non-Baltic ethnic groups 
as workers into Latvia and Estonia and to a lesser degree, Lithu-
ania. The fear of becoming an ethnic minority in their own 
republic fuels the Baltic activism and nationalism that now 
spearheads the drive for national independence and secession 
from the Soviet Union. Of the three Baltic republics, the ethnic 
composition is the most critical in Latvia where only 54 percent 
of the total population of 2.7 million is Latvian. In Estonia the 
situation is similar as 65 percent of the 1.6 million population is 
Estonian. On the other hand, Lithuanians enjoy 80 percent major-
ity in their state of 3.7 million. In all three republics the national 
movements that quickly formed by 1988 under Gorbachev's 
reform-minded leadership, mobilized peoples toward a recovery 
of the past, the end of demographic and linguistic Russification, 
a struggle against environmental pollution, greater local auton-
omy, republic-level self-financing, and real democracy. 8 
In all three instances, environmental activists in the Baltic 
republics first acted in an effort to gain control over their own 
environment, resources and economy. In Latvia, it was the Envi-
ronmental Protection Club, known by its Latvian initial V AK, that 
criticized in 1986 the construction of a massive hydroelectric 
station in the town of Daugavpils. The hotly debated project by 
Latvian activists in the biweekly journal Literatura lill Maksla 
caused the USSR State Planning Committee to mandate an expert 
assessment of the project which, in January 1987 found it eco-
nomically unsound and halted the construction in November 
1987. 
In Lithuania, ecological concerns also became the center 
of sharp focus by the Movement to Support Perestroika (Sajudis) 
after the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in northeastern Lithuania 
caught fire on September 5, 1988. By October, Sajudis protests 
led to a halt in a construction of a third planned reactor block. 
Estonia as well initiated an environmental movement in 1986 over 
the phosphorate mining conditions outside of Tallinn that evolved 
into a democratic movement demanding, among other things, 
economic autonomy and the supremacy of Estonian law over all-
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union rule in cultural and political spheres. The ecologically 
motivated Baltic movements scored early important victories that 
led to political demands . 
Fortified by their success in the environmental movement, 
the Baltic activists now enlarged their demands for regional 
autonomy to include political issues. In their fight to reclaim 
national sovereignty, the symbols of independent Latvia, Lithu-
ania and Estonia became a powerful inspiration for the Baltic 
national movements as they actively pressed their demands for 
greater autonomy. The Baltic drive for independence is also 
fueled by the fact of their interwar independence that still remains 
a living memory to many of their citizens. 9 An important goal of 
the first phase of the national movements was to gain official 
status for the flags and anthems of the interwar independent Baltic 
states. By the end of 1988, the communist authorities in the Baltic 
states granted official status to the flags of independent interwar 
Baltic republics. By the fall of 1990, hundreds of these flags were 
carried by demonstrators during mass rallies and protests. 
The success of this initial campaign, valued more for it 
symbolic rather than actual substantive value, moved the Baltic 
people to press on with their demand for the publication of the 
secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact propelled now 
by broadly -based movements known as popular fronts. The facts 
surrounding the claimed forced incorporation of Latvia, Lithu-
ania and Estonia into the Soviet Union during the war and 
especially the public airing of the secret protocol concluded 
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany became an early key 
demand of Baltic activists. 
Until the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 
August 23, 1939 sealed their fate, the three Baltic republics 
enjoyed relative prosperity and independence. The pact's secret 
"additional protocol" assigned Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet 
sphere of influence , while Lithuania was left initially to Germany. 
After the collapse of Poland most of Lithuania was placed into the 
Soviet sphere of influence as well. After the international order in 
Europe collapsed, all three republics, operating under heavy 
Soviet influence guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army, 
presented their application for membership in the USSR on July 
21, 1940 in Moscow. 
Despite the stem warnings from Moscow, the Lithuanian 
legislature voted on September 24, 1989 to declare the 1940 
Soviet annexation of the republic invalid, thus supplying what 
could ultimately become the legal basis for secession. The vote in 
1940 to join the Soviet Union, the legislature said, was not only 
involuntary but improper because such questions must be submit-
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ted to a popular referendum. 10" After many denials the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry finally acknowledged on February 27, 1990 that 
it had found copies of a secret Soviet-Nazi agreement that allotted 
parts of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Yestnik, a new 
magazine published by the Foreign Ministry, showed photo-
graphs of a typewritten Russian-language copy of the "Secret 
Additional Protocol." 11 
The success of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
popular fronts which have only been in formal existence since 
October 1988 has inspired the formation of similar groups inside 
the Soviet Union, with activists from various republics coming to 
the Baltic popular fronts to learn tactics and structure. In 1988 and 
1989, the Baltic states offered a safe haven, political advice, and 
logistical support to movements from other republics still har-
assed and persecuted by their authorities. The inability of the 
central government to prevent "spillover" from the Baltic repub-
lics resulted in declaration of sovereignty or independence by 
almost all fifteen Union Republics. 
It was this spreading of yearning for independence from 
the Baltic to other union republic that has awakened foreboding 
and agitation in the Kremlin. The Baltic movements, which 
dispute the legitimacy of Soviet power in their republics and 
demand the right to decide whether they will remain within the 
Soviet federation 12, created tensions within the Kremlin leader-
ship and prompted Mr. Ligachev to issue a warning in September 
1989 that if the ethnic discord continues, "the disintegration of the 
Union of the Soviet Republics is inevitable." 13 Mr. Gorbachev 
also warned Lithuanian activists that he does not plan to be 
remembered as the Soviet leader who lost the Baltic and attacked 
the ethnic unrest as an attempt to endanger his proposed program 
of perestroika. While addressing a special meeting of the Commu-
nist Party's Central Committee on September 20, 1989, Gor-
bachev called the talk of secession, in particular the well-organ-
ized autonomy movements in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as 
"an irresponsible game" that not only interfered with his reform 
plans, but also could lead to a civil war. 
Lithuania became the first of the three Baltic states to 
challenge formally the legitimacy of Soviet rule, but Estonia and 
Latvia were not far behind. On December 10, 1989 Lithuania 
became the first Soviet republic to abolish the Communist Party's 
guaranteed monopoly on power when its parliament voted to 
legalize rival political parties. In February 1990, in the Soviet 
Union's first free multi party election in seven decades, the Soviet 
Communist Party was overwhelmingly rebuffed by voters. The 
loyalists of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Communist Party 
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won only 7 of the 90 seats filled by voters-all managed among 
the republic's non-Lithuanian minority. The election results, from 
a turnout estimated at more than 70 percent of eligible voters, was 
the most forceful demonstration so far of the prevailing view of 
the Lithuanian people that the Soviet Union has never held 
legitimate authority over the republic since it was annexed in 
1940. The plan of the pro-independence Sajudis strategists was 
then to use their new parliamentary majority to name a new 
president, Vytautas Landsbergis, and formally declare political 
independence by calling an immediate end to the Communist 
Party's vast patronage monopoly over Lithuania's institutional 
life. After that, Lithuanian leaders hoped to negotiate with Presi-
dent Gorbachev and the Central Government on the details of a 
complete break. The official declaration of independence was 
announced on March 11, 1990. 
The boldness of the Baltic national movement caught 
Moscow by surprise. Reacting to the fast-pace developments in 
Vilnius, the Soviet authorities sent a column of tanks and para-
troopers rumbling past an all-night session of the Lithuanian 
Parliament early on March 24, 1990 in what witnesses described 
as the strongest attempt yet to intimidate the republic into aban-
doning its declaration of independence announced on March 11. 
Dismissing the republic's declaration of independence as illicit, 
Gorbachev justified the troop movements as "part of the national 
Government's duty to preserve law in what remains a Soviet 
republic." Self-determination, he urged, "is an issue to be settled 
by mutual agreement under pending constitutional provisions. "14 
As they are being shaped by Gorbachev officials, however, these 
provisions threaten to add years of political hurdles to Lithuania's 
course. 
Estonia has been charting its own, more cautious approach 
to independence, a slower pace that legislators deny is related to 
Mr. Gorbachev's pressure on Lithuania. Gorbachev asked Esto-
nians to retract its initial move toward an independence resolu-
tion, approved on March 31, 1990, in which the Soviet Union was 
accused of illegally occupying the republic for the last 50 years. 
Concerned about the "domino" theory, President Gorbachev 
warned against Estonia's following Lithuania in declaring inde-
pendence. In a telephone call to President Arnold F. Ruutel from 
the Kremlin on April 3, 1990, theSovietleaderexpressedconcem 
that the Baltic republics' rebellion be contained. In contrast to the 
Lithuanian declaration, the Estonian sovereignty resolution ap-
proved in Tallinn was not a full declaration of independence, but 
rather a notice to Moscow that the republic has started on a gradual 
course of reclaiming independent statehood lost in the forced 
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Soviet annexation of 1940. 
After initial tough talk on Lithuania, the White House 
softened its tone, making it clear that the United States was not 
prepared to take the Baltic republic's side in its test of wills with 
Moscow. Western European leaders, concerned about wider 
repercussions of the Baltic crisis, also neither encouraged nor 
rejected Lithuania's claim to independence. They avoided any 
direct criticism of the Soviet Army's reported violent roundup of 
Lithuanian deserters in Vilnius. Washington instead called for 
negotiations between Lithuania and Moscow and said "any other 
resolution runs the risk of being counterproductive" for Soviet-
American relations. During the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard A. Shevardnadze on April 4, 1990 in Washington, Secre-
tary of State James A. Baker cautioned that a crackdown in 
Lithuania could wipe out much of the progress made in Soviet-
American relations in the last year. 15 
While the administration downplayed the Lithuanian is-
sue in Soviet-American relations, Congress passed a delicately 
phrased resolution, which has no legal force, for the President "to 
plan for and take steps, at the earliest possible time, that would 
normalize diplomatic relations with the new Government of 
Lithuania." American policy is complicated by the fact that even 
though the United States has never recognized Lithuania's incor-
poration into the Soviet Union in 1940, it did sign the Helsinki 
accords in the 1970s that accepted Europe's de facto borders in 
exchange for human-rights concessions by the Soviet bloc. Un-
less dramatic events in the Soviet Union cause equally dramatic 
reversal of U.S. foreign policy, the American administration's 
policy continues to echo Mr. Gorbachev's sentiment that "it 
would be sad and dangerous if an incorrect interpretation would 
endanger what has been achieved in international relations in 
recent years." 16 
Even though the Baltic republics continued to press their 
demands for independence during the second half of 1990, the 
international scene, and the American administration, was domi-
nated by the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. When the conscription issue in 
Lithuanian heated up in October after the legislature proposed that 
Moscow allow Lithuanian military recruits to do their mandatory 
service in their homeland, the Kremlin responded that the Lithu-
anian republic isa part of the Soviet Union, which has a constitution 
and a law on Universal Military Service. A political solution to the 
draft question was attainable after Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev 
offered that 25 percent of all non-Russian draftees will be allowed 
to serve in their home districts. 17 Nikolai Ryzhkov, during his 
negotiations with Lithuanian President Landsbergis stressed 
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Moscow's willingness to meet Lithuania halfway as long as basic 
principles are not violated. Such basic principles were in question 
when Defense Minister Dmitri T. Yazov vehemently condemned 
any attempts to set up military regiments by the republic and 
suggested that the aim of such units was armed resistance to 
Moscow. 18 Moscow's resort to force, an instrument renounced by 
Gorbachev during Eastern Europe's democratization process in 
1989, sowed doubts in the West concerning Moscow's sincerity 
and determination to continue its reform programs. 
The crisis in the Baltic republics is due to the fact that the 
national movements set the agenda to which Moscow only reacted 
or not acted at all. Consequently, Gorbachev's program has 
constantly been lagging behind the escalating demands of the 
republics. Starting with a call for "the complete political and 
economic decentralization" in June 1988, the Baltic activists 
stepped up their demands for sovereignty and finally full inde-
pendence by early 1990. Only after the Lithuanian and Estonian 
parliaments devised plans for achieving full independence did the 
Soviet leadership propose specific measures for reforming the 
national-state structure. Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of 
Lithuania, told Gorbachev: "Imagine how skeptical we are of a 
new Union whose plan we have not seen." 19 
The continued demand for Baltic independence can result 
in dramatic disintegration of the Soviet Union. In an interview in 
the Soviet weekly Sobesednik, USSR People's Deputy Yurii 
Afanasyev, a rector of the Moscow Historical-Archival Institute 
who supports Baltic drive for sovereignty, predicted that the 
Soviet Union will be transformed into a union of sovereign states. 
According to him, the disintegration of the Soviet Union can now 
be stopped only "by force," an act which would "delay for decades 
the establishment of normal neighborly relations" between Russia 
and the other republics. Similar! y, he argues, Gorbachev' s ploy of 
attempting to hold the USSR together through the instrument of 
the newly established "strong presidency" is also doomed: "The 
idea of a democratic dictatorship is not destined to be realized." 20 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn also offers vision of a Russian 
future in his programmatic brochure, "How Shall We Reconsti-
tute Russia?" published in two major Soviet newspapers. Solz-
henitsyn says clearly that the Soviet Union has no future as a single 
state. Centrifugal developments and separatist tendencies, he 
argues, have advanced to a point where the union can be held 
together only at the cost of enormous bloodshed. Russia, Solz-
henitsyn contends, should herself take the initiative to disband an 
empire that is sapping her strength and in fact killing her.21 Most 
Russian nationalists, however, insist on the preservation of the 
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territorial integrity of the USSR. Organizations such as Nash 
Sovremennik, Molodiya Gvardiya. or Moskva have suddenly 
turned into supporters of "true federalism. "22 
American policy toward the Soviet Union is faced now 
with a fundamentally important fact: The Soviet Union of the past 
is ceasing to exist. What will replace the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republic will have profound influence on the develop-
ment of the people within the Union as well as on the development 
of regional and international relations. The nationalist demands of 
the Baltic states--political independence from the Soviet Un-
ion-strikes at the heart of American policy that aims to promote 
democratic transformation of the Soviet Union at the same time as 
giving unconditional support to Gorbachev and his policy of 
perestroika. 
While Gorbachev has been highly successful in convinc-
ing an international audience of the existence of a global commu-
nity confronted with common problems and sharing all-human 
values and interests, domestically, he has been unable to further 
a sense of commonwealth and of a common future within a Soviet 
federation. The Kremlin's inability to stop or at least slow down 
the Baltic call for separatism pushed Gorbachev to his last-ditch 
effort to keep the Soviet Union intact by calling for a national 
referendum on the nation's future scheduled for March 17, 1991. 
Regardless of its outcome, the future of the Soviet Union depends 
more on a quick and equitable resolution of its systemic crisis. 
As the political developments in the era of ~lasnost and 
perestroika already indicate, a renewal of the federation system is 
unlikely to satisfy all ethnic problems and demand and may 
actually increase the nationalistic tendencies in the Baltic states 
and other union republics. Moscow's continued inability to 
resolve the national demands of the Baltic republics and other 
ethnic groups in the Soviet Union within the framework of the 
present federal structure and proposed economic restructuring 
can lead not only to chaos and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union into its constituent republics, but also to deterioration in 
East-West relations and resumption of international hostilities. 
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